UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25014
24 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SOMALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to you and the members of the Security Council for unanimously adopting resolution 794 (1992). We are also indeed grateful for all those countries, the United States of America foremost, that have made their contributions in response to the said resolution to boost the effectiveness of the international efforts to feed the starving population in Somalia. In this respect, we can only commend the operations undertaken by the Unified Military Command led by the United States.

I cannot pass without commending the exceptional efforts of the Secretary-General in seeking the necessary international support for resolving the Somali question and for his attempts at effecting adequate measures to enable the Somalis to deal with their humanitarian, security and political crisis. Indeed, the Secretary-General's report (S/24992) is a timely and analytical piece of work that brings the most immediate issues and tasks to light on the eve of the necessary preparations for consolidating the positive impact - so far - of resolution 794 (1992) and for lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

Having studied the said report and the letter of the Permanent Representative of the United States to the Security Council (S/24976), I wish to share some thoughts with the members of the Council with a view to providing them some feedback on behalf of the most neutral voice of the Somali people.

Finally, and further to my letters contained in documents S/23445, S/23507 and Corr.1, S/23763 and S/23957, I would be grateful if this letter, together with its annex, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fatun Mohamed HASSAN
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Note on the report of the Secretary-General

1. The results of Operation Restore Hope have been generally successful thus far, and I hope it continues as successful as it has so far. The mandate of the Unified Military Command led by the United States was clearly stipulated in Security Council resolution 794 (1992). Indeed, the objective of the operation was, and remains to be, establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations, which I believe has been achieved in all those parts where the Unified Military Command has so far established its presence. It must be appreciated, however, that there is a genuine concern regarding the means and ways for consolidating the positive impacts of the operation as well as its appropriate, effective and smooth transition to its next stage.

2. Ideally, the situation in Somalia should not call for any striking differences between parties (i.e. the United Nations and the United States) in their approach to the transition to the next phase of the ongoing operations. The current situation has evolved out of the uniqueness of the Somali question which, by definition, presents new challenges to the United Nations, as it exists today, and to the mandate of its chartered bodies. It is my view, therefore, that it must be similarly addressed with unique measures. I hasten to add, however, that any such unique measures as might be applied should stem from a perception of the specific Somali dilemma and a real concern for the deplorable conditions of the Somali people. The measures should, therefore, single-mindedly address Somali issues first.

3. I firmly believe that the Somali crisis and its solution will not pass unnoticed in history and will involve a lot of lessons learned for the world in future similar experiences. There are, however, those who allege, unfortunately, that the Somali question has become a "test case" for gigantic plans for reshaping the world into a "new order" or a pretext for achieving ambitious schemes for strengthening the military power of the United Nations in dealing with similar situations in the future. I am deeply saddened, as are all the Somali people, by the mere thought of these allegations and I would like to believe they are baseless. On the other hand, I wish to assure the Council that we are indeed very grateful for all that has been rendered so far and that we appreciate the complexity of our Somali problem, for which we have no one to blame but ourselves first. I trust that the Council will, therefore, continue focused on the uniqueness of the Somali crisis in its continued efforts to help the Somalis to deal with it and the rest of the world to help.

4. In this connection, I am inclined to support the Secretary-General's position in requesting the Security Council to defer any new decisions on the situation until he has obtained the views of all factions to the ideas referred to in paragraphs 23 to 25 and 27 of his report (S/24992), the operative part of which is further promulgated under paragraph 32 of the same report. In addition to ongoing consultations with all factions in Somalia,

the collective view of these factions could be determined during the "informal preparatory meeting" scheduled for 4 January 1992 and over which, I understand, the Secretary-General will preside. In the meantime and pending the convening of the meeting, efforts could continue towards translating the conceptual framework outlined in the report to a detailed plan. I believe that, given the agreement of all the Somali factions to the conceptual plan described in the Secretary-General's report, the situation will inevitably require an exceptional Security Council resolution that will enforce such agreements under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

5. This entails that the Security Council will have extraordinarily to provide powers, under its own auspices, to a "Unified Military Task Force" under the command of the United Nations, (a) to enforce agreements reached by all the 12 Somali factions, (b) to consolidate the secure environment achieved by the Unified Military Command led by the United States for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief and (c) to improve further on and maintain the conditions of peace and security throughout the country until an effective national authority has been established. It is my firm belief that this would have a proportionate effect on the time it would take to attain a definite negotiated political settlement between the Somali factions themselves.

6. I do, however, also subscribe to the view that, even during this current phase, international presence and assistance should be available to all parts of Somalia, regardless of the need for military operations or not. Indeed, efforts and plans to rehabilitate basic social and economic services and basic infrastructure, to restore local civil administration, to resettle internally displaced persons and to repatriate refugees should have been already under way in all those zones and/or localities where conditions permit, in line with paragraph 12 of resolution 767 (1992). I honestly believe that the speedy implementation of the foregoing measures could be a catalyst for peace and stability that would minimize the scale of the would-be requirements for forceful measures. More specifically, non-coercive measures for disarming, inducing peace and restoring order could by effectively and permanently conceived only within the framework of programmes that engage the communities in more purposeful activities for their own recovery and rehabilitation.

7. In the light of the above and in awareness of existing pressures to resolve the situation as quickly as possible:

(a) Firstly, I wish to encourage the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to translate his ideas into concrete plans for presentation to the concerned Somali factions in the near future, perhaps during the scheduled meeting in the beginning of January 1992, if possible;

(b) Secondly, I find it most prudent, under the circumstances, if the Security Council would defer any new decisions on the matter until such time that the Secretary-General has obtained the views and/or the agreement of all factions; and that the Security Council adopts, at the appropriate time, a resolution that would exceptionally mandate the Secretary-General to put together an international peace-keeping force that has an adequate capacity to enforce peace in Somalia under a United Nations command;

(c) Thirdly, I trust that the United States will consider the situation positively, as it always has, and will ensure that the United Nations will eventually take over responsibility from the Unified Military Command effectively to continue the inevitable peace-keeping operations in good time for all and in a manner most suitable for the task at hand;

(d) Fourthly, I can only plead with all States Members of the United Nations to provide the resources that will be deemed indispensable for a successful transition to effectively enforced peace-keeping operations to bring the humanitarian and security dimensions of the Somali crisis to an end and to provide a cradle for reconciliation and stability in Somalia.